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The awarding of port services to private operators has become one of the most important tools for port 
authorities to retain some control on the organization and structure of the supply side of the terminal 
market. This paper discusses the awarding of terminals in European ports from an EU legal and policy 
context. It also seeks to provide in-depth information on current practices and perceptions of port 
authorities around Europe on tendering and contractual arrangements linked to the awarding of terminals. 
The relevant issues relate to the terminal awarding processes, the duration of the terminal award contract 
and the contract stipulations. The paper also seeks to understand whether the practices are influenced by 
factors such as terminal size, the competitive environment in which the port operates and the geographical 
location. 
 






The awarding of port services to private operators has become one of the most 
important tools for port authorities to influence the prosperity of the port community 
(Notteboom, 2007; Pallis et al., 2008). Through the awarding procedures and the 
contract, port authorities can in principle retain some control on the organization and 
structure of the supply side of the terminal market, while optimizing the use of scarce 
resources such as land. This paper contains the main findings of a survey on the 
awarding of terminals in Europe. The survey was commissioned by the European Sea 
Ports Organisation (ESPO) in response to the European Commission’s ports policy 
communication which was published in October 2007. With this paper, we aim to 
provide a better understanding of current practices of port authorities in Europe. 
In a first part, the paper discusses the EU legal and policy context governing the 
awarding of terminals in European ports. The remaining sections of the paper seek to 
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provide in-depth information on current practices and perceptions of port authorities 
around Europe on tendering and contractual arrangements linked to the awarding of 
terminals. The paper also seeks to understand whether practices are influenced by 
factors such as terminal size, the competitive environment in which the port operates 
and the geographical location. Due to confidentially reasons, this paper only contains 
aggregated results grouping terminal projects and ports considered. 
 
 
2. The EU context: rules on service concessions and the European ports policy 
communication 
 
2.1. The uncertain status of terminal awarding regimes under EU law 
 
The granting of rights of use to ships, goods and terminal operators is subject to the 
general rules of the EU Treaty, such as the provisions regarding freedom to provide 
services and the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position. The awarding of long-term 
rights of use to port service providers, especially in cargo-handling, can be governed by 
a number of legal constructions (Van Hooydonk, 2002), including the rather rigid EU 
Directives on public procurement and the more flexible regime governing service 
concessions which seems to be the preferred option for port authorities. Essential 
elements of service concessions include the transfer of responsibilities to the 
concessionaire and the fact that a significant risk inherent in the delivery of the services 
lies with the concessionaire (Petschke, 2008).  
The granting of service concessions is subject to general EU legal principles of 
equality of treatment, transparency, proportionality and mutual recognition which the 
European Commission clarified in a horizontal interpretative communication (European 
Commission, 2000). It was however for a long time unclear to what extent these 
principles were applicable to the variety of terminal awarding regimes existing in 
Member States (Van Hooydonk, 2002). Whereas in some countries these are governed 
by public law and take the form of public service contracts or public domain 
concessions, in others these are governed by private law and take the shape of ordinary 
lease agreements. In yet other cases a variety of unilateral permits, authorisations and 
licenses exists, whereas some countries or ports do not seem to have any particular 
regime or form whatsoever (ESPO, 2005). Also, the notion ‘services’ caused 
considerable confusion since service concessions would normally concern activities 
whose nature and purpose, as well as the rules to which they are subject, are likely to be 
the State's responsibility and may be subject to exclusive or special rights (European 
Commission, 2000). Privatisation processes have however more or less liberalised cargo 
handling services in most Member States and the European Court of Justice even ruled 
that these services are of a commercial nature and not different from any other 
economic activities (European Court of Justice, 1991). 
 
2.2. The port services’ Directive: a failed attempt to provide legal certainty 
 
The European Commission published in 2001 a Directive proposal on market access 
to port services (European Commission, 2001). The aim of the proposal was to establish 
rules for market access to port services including the use of transparent selection 
procedures. The political debate, animated by aggressive trade union protests, focused 
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on labour-related aspects of the proposal. The essence of the Directive was however 
about the way in which port authorities would use terminal awarding agreements to 
regulate market access for potential service providers, thus ensuring market 
contestability and intra-port competition (De Langen and Pallis, 2006; Verhoeven, 
2006; Pallis, 2007). The Directive proposal also set rules to avoid discriminatory 
behaviour of port authorities that were directly or indirectly engaged in the provision of 
port services themselves. 
Although the Commission’s initial proposal was quite dogmatic, the compromise that 
was painstakingly devised afterwards by Council and Parliament did acknowledge the 
strategic role of port authorities and took into account the need to ensure continuity of 
investments and legal certainty for existing agreements. Influenced by continued labour 
unrest as well as internal political meddling, the European Parliament however rejected 
the final compromise on the Directive proposal in November 2003. In 2004 a second 
version was published (European Commission, 2004) which also failed to find political 
support, mainly because some of its key features did not respect the compromises 
already reached on the first proposal (Verhoeven, 2006). The uncertainty regarding the 
status of terminal awarding regimes under EU law therefore continued to exist.  
 
2.3. The soft law approach of the European Ports Policy Communication 
 
Following the rather traumatic double failure of the port services’ Directive, the 
European Commission took its recourse to ‘soft law’ and published, after an extensive 
process of consultation, a Communication on a European Ports Policy (European 
Commission, 2007) which contained a chapter with guidance on the use of port 
concessions. The Commission confirms that terminal awarding agreements granted by a 
public port authority are to be considered as service concessions under EU law, 
regardless what their status is under national law (public or private law, contract or 
unilateral measure etc.). The key element is not the actual cargo handling service itself 
which – as explained above – is a normal commercial service, but the fact that access to 
port land is a precondition for providing this service. The granting of the use of a piece 
of port land would thus be a measure through which the port authority disposes of a 
public good of which the availability is limited and which allows the performance of the 
commercial cargo handling activity which would not be possible without the availability 
of this public good. The public aspect would even be stronger in case port infrastructure 
is financed by public means. Only if the port and its real estate would be fully private, 
run as private companies and if all its components would be fully financed by private 
means an exemption from the rules governing service concessions would seem to be 
feasible (European Commission, 2008). 
The application of EC Treaty rules and principles on service concessions is elaborated 
in the above-mentioned horizontal interpretative communication of the Commission 
(European Commission, 2000). This guidance has now been specifically applied to the 
port sector through the concessions chapter of the European Ports Policy 
Communication. The Commission first of all identifies the basic principle that public 
authorities granting a concession are bound by a transparency obligation, implying that 
their initiative must be adequately advertised, that the procedure must be fair and non-
discriminatory and that it can be reviewed.  Such obligation of transparency consists in 
ensuring, for the benefit of any potential candidate, a degree of advertising sufficient to 
enable the concession to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of the 
selection procedure to be reviewed. The transparency obligation would not only apply 
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to concessions involving cargo handling services, but also those concerning technical-
nautical services (pilotage, towage and mooring). Here the Commission is more precise 
about the use of selection procedures, stipulating that these must be given ‘adequate, 
European-wide publicity’. 
Seen from a port governance point of view, the Commission clarifies some important 
additional points. First it says that the transparency obligation does not hinder port 
authorities from setting selection criteria which reflect the commercial strategy and 
development policy of a given port that will be the basis for granting the concession. 
This is an important recognition of the discretionary power of port authorities, which 
was a crucial issue during the debate on the port services’ Directive. In addition, the 
transparency obligation would only apply to contract awards having a sufficient 
connection with the functioning of the internal market, excluding for instance cases of 
very modest economic interest which would make contract awards of no interest to 
economic operators located in other Member States. The second important point relates 
to the length of concessions. According to the Commission, durations must be set so 
that these do not limit open competition beyond what is required to ensure that the 
investment is paid off and there is a reasonable return on invested capital, whilst 
maintaining a risk inherent in exploitation by the concessionaire. This again 
corresponds with the perspective of the port authority, wishing to ensure a balance 
between a reasonable payback period for the investments made by terminal operators, 
on the one hand, and a maximum entry to potential newcomers, on the other 
(Notteboom, 2007). The Commission adds that, when a concession expires, renewal is 
considered equivalent to granting a new concession and is therefore bound by the 
above-mentioned transparency obligation. This raises an important question regarding 
the common practice of prolongations whereby a concessionaire makes additional 
investments before the expiry of his concession. Also, it is not clear to what extent 
clauses on possible prolongations can already be included in the initial concession 
agreement. A third point is that the Commission accepts provisions in concession 
agreements which aim at ensuring that the terms of the concession are respected and at 
protecting the legitimate interests of ports and local communities, notably with regard to 
overall quality and performance of port services. A condition is that these provisions do 
not infringe Treaty rules or Community legislation. The Commission would thus allow 
the active use of concessions as intelligent governance tools, an issue which is 
elaborated further in this paper. The final point relates to the safeguarding of rights of 
workers in case of transfer of activity further to a selection procedure. This would mean 
that, subject to conditions, new concessionaires may be obliged to take over staff 
employed by the previous concessionaire. It remains to be seen to what extent this may 
impose an entry barrier to new operators and thus reduce market contestability.  
 
2.4. Further initiatives 
 
It is important to underline again that most of what is explained above is based on the 
interpretation of the European Commission and has therefore the status of ‘soft law’. 
For the time being there is no secondary legislation in place which confirms these 
principles although the Commission is considering the development of a horizontal 
Directive on concessions (Petschke, 2008). Neither is there solid jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice available in the field of port concessions. Port authorities 
could therefore choose to take the risk of ignoring the principles that the Commission 
set out in its ports policy communication. This hardly seems a responsible strategy 
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however. Leaving aside the possibility that a legislative approach may still be 
forthcoming, it would be unwise to ignore the above-cited principles simply because it 
is likely to incite litigation from operators who were not granted a concession in a given 
port. The question should therefore rather be whether the guidance provided by the 
Commission provides sufficient legal certainty for port authorities and recognises and 
empowers their strategic role of port authorities.  
The Commission’s guidance can be qualified as being very supportive to the position 
of the port authority, confirming its discretionary power in the selection of operators 
and the setting of concession conditions. Apart from specific questions already raised 
above, such as the prolongations of concessions and take-over of personnel, two 
fundamental problems however remain which are inherent to the ‘soft law’ nature of the 
Commission’s communication. First, contrary to for instance the port services Directive, 
the communication does not foresee transitional rules for existing agreements since it is 
not introducing new legislation but simply giving an overview of principles based on 
the fundamental rules of the Treaty. It is however common knowledge that many 
concessions in European ports were not granted on the basis of the transparency 
obligation required by the Commission. This leaves a great deal of uncertainty as 
regards existing agreements. Second, it could be argued that the interpretative guidance 
of the Commission may not be sufficient to empower the position of port authorities and 
ensure a level playing field among them that would match the bargaining power of 
terminal operators as well as political influence often exercised in the granting of 
concessions (Verhoeven, 2008). 
It is obvious that these concerns could have been more adequately addressed through 
legislation which would undisputedly have created greater legal certainty. The future 
will demonstrate how effective the soft law approach will be. In this respect, two 
pending issues should be noted. First, there is the already mentioned possibility that 
secondary legislation on concessions may still be forthcoming, but then at a more 
horizontal, cross-sector level. This is however not certain and in any case not expected 
to happen before 2010. Second, there is the survey on current practices regarding the 
awarding of seaport terminal contracts in Europe which the European Sea Ports 
Organisaton (ESPO) commissioned in 2008 and of which the results are summarised in 
this paper. The survey is a first step towards the publication of a code of good 
governance on port concessions which ESPO is preparing to complement the soft law 
guidance provided by the Commission. It is hoped that in this way a number of the 
unanswered questions may be solved in a practical manner. 
 
 
3. Set-up of the survey 
 
In order to shed light on terminal awarding practices in Europe, the first part of the 
survey contained questions related to the situation in Europe. In total about 80 port 
authorities around Europe received the survey. Answers were obtained for 43 terminal 
projects in European seaports, resulting in a response rate of 54%. Two thirds of these 
projects relate to greenfield developments (i.e. the terminal site is either reclaimed from 
the sea or encompasses land not previously used for port or industrial activities), while 
the remaining cases relate to brownfield sites (i.e. site has been used before for other 
port or industrial activities). About 44% of the terminals considered started operations 
recently. For about a quarter of the projects, the awarding and contracting procedures 
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are already completed, but the terminal has not started up operations yet. In 13% of the 
cases the awarding procedure is completed, but the contract with the future operator is 
not finalized yet. For the remaining cases the awarding procedure has not been started 
up yet or the awarding procedure is ongoing. 
Table 1: Distribution of responses to the survey (43 terminal projects in Europe). 
Terminal Size No.   No. 
0-5 ha 4  Hamburg-Le Havre range 12 
5-50 ha 17  Scandinavia/Baltic 10 
50-100 ha 6  Mediterranean 12 
>100 ha 9  Atlantic range 5 
Not indicated 7  United Kingdom/Ireland 0 
TOTAL 43  Black Sea 3 
  
 Other 1 
  
 TOTAL 43 
 
Table 1 depicts the distribution of responses to the survey. Large, medium-sized as 
well as small terminal projects are represented in the survey. About 61% of all 
responses relate to container terminal projects (26 in total). We estimate that this 
represents about 35 to 40% of all container terminals in Europe that have started/will 
start operations or have been/will be awarded in the period 2003-2010. The survey 
results are mainly providing a good representation of the current situation in the 
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Figure 1: Distribution of responses according to terminal type. 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 45 (2010): 83-101 
 89 
Some important remarks should be made with respect to the terminal projects 
considered in the survey. First and foremost, port management systems differ 
significantly in Europe. The survey was mainly relevant for ‘landlord’ ports in Europe, 
thereby excluding quite a number of European ports mainly situated in the United 
Kingdom, Scandinavia but also elsewhere. Second, ongoing port reform programs 
imply that quite a number of European ports are in a transition phase. Newer EU 
Member States such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania have recently witnessed a shift 
from state-owned and state-operated ports to a landlord-type of port management 
system. For example, the Polish ‘Law Act on ports and harbours’ demands from port 
authorities to execute privatization of port terminals/operators which formerly were 
state-owned companies. Such activities are in progress in Gdynia since 2001 and up to 
now two of the four terminals have been privatized, while the other two are still owned 
and controlled by the State. Countries like France and Spain are presently undergoing 
major changes in their respective national port policies.  
 
 
4. Survey results: the terminal award process 
 
4.1. A classification of awarding procedures 
 
Terminals may be awarded by several methods, including without limitation, by direct 
appointment, private negotiation from a qualified pool, or using a competitive process. 
The survey revealed that, for the given port project sample, competitive bidding is the 
most common procedure used in concession granting today (table 2). Quite remarkably, 
direct appointment seems to be more common among larger terminals. Processes of 
private negotiation from a qualified pool are mainly used for smaller terminals. 
Mediterranean ports massively opt for competitive bidding processes, while the Baltic 
ports show the largest diversity in awarding methods. It is difficult to quantify to what 
extent national and supranational legislation, port privatization schemes and legal 
disputes have contributed to this situation. Any competitive bidding should comply with 
the principle of equality, which states that every candidate should be equally treated and 
compared and that there will be no favoritism in the awarding of the concession or no 
substantial reduction of competition. 
Table 2: The type of awarding process used. 
 ALL Size of terminal Region 
  <50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha Baltic H-LH 
range Med Other 
Type of awarding process for 
the specific terminal prjects         
Awarding by direct appointment 
or direct adjudication 14% 5% 17% 22% 33% 15% 0% 11% 
Awarding through a process of 
private and bilateral negotiations 
from a qualified pool of market 
players 
11% 19% 0% 0% 22% 23% 0% 0% 
Awarding through a competitive 
process (including public 
tendering or competitive bidding) 
75% 76% 83% 78% 44% 62% 100% 89% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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In only 21% of the projects following a competitive bidding process, potential 
candidates were invited by the port authority. In 83% of the cases, the port authority 
published an open call for tender. It has to be stressed that such an open call in quite of 
number of cases does not involve a public tendering procedure. It often involved an 
open assessment procedure with room for negotiations and the submission of improved 
proposals during the process. In 68% of the ‘open call for tender’ cases the terminal is 
awarded on the basis of the offers of the eligible candidates, followed by one or more 
negotiation rounds. In the remaining cases the terminal is awarded on the basis of the 
offers of the eligible candidates without any negotiations or the possibility for 
candidates to submit a revised proposal during the awarding process. Some ports use 
different types of tendering procedures depending on specific criteria: for example, a 
limited or ‘light’ version for smaller facilities and a full version for larger terminals. 
In the cases where terminals were directly appointed, port authorities did so mainly 
for strategic reasons (e.g. the creation of intra-port competition or the securing of further 
expansion possibilities for efficient incumbent firms) or because the terminal project 
represented a marginal extension of an existing facility (for instance the extension of an 
existing container terminal with one berth). 
Table 3: The geographical and market scope of the awarding process. 
 ALL Size of terminal Region 
  <50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha Baltic H-LH 
range Med Other 
Regarding the awarding 
process, how extensive was 
the related publicity? 
        
Announced on a national scale 17% 18% 25% 11% 33% 0% 11% 40% 
Announced on a European scale 38% 64% 0% 0% 33% 33% 33% 40% 
Announced on an international 
scale 46% 18% 75% 89% 33% 67% 56% 20% 
 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
       
What kind of terminal 
operators are involved in the 
awarding process? 
 
       
Local operators 12% 19% 0% 11% 20% 17% 0% 13% 
Local and national operators 16% 19% 20% 0% 10% 8% 17% 38% 
Local, national and foreign 
operators 72% 62% 80% 89% 70% 75% 83% 50% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
In case of a competitive bidding process, in almost half of the cases the port authority 
announced the awarding process on an international scale, 35% on a European scale and 
only 17% on a national scale (table 3). Not surprisingly, larger terminals show the most 
international focus. The awarding process for Baltic ports tends to be much more 
locally-oriented than the Hamburg-Le Havre range and the Med range. A possible 
explanation lies in the lower direct liner connectivity of the Baltic region to the 
international trade routes. Hence, Baltic ports are typically focused on intra-Baltic trade, 
shortsea services from the rest of Europe and feeder services in relation to the mainports 
in the Hamburg-Le Havre range. When asking about the kind of terminal operators 
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involved in the awarding process, 72% of the respondents pointed out that the bidding 
process involved local, national and foreign operators, whereas the remainder only 
included local and or national operators. Also here, large terminals have the widest 
coverage (table 3). 
In case the awarding of the terminal takes place via a competitive process, a wide 
diversity exists in stages/rounds included in the awarding process (table 4). In about 
38% of the cases, the terminal is awarded to one of the candidates in only one round. 
One third of the projects considered involves the reduction of the number of candidates 
in a first round (via a qualification/eligibility stage or selection stage). The remaining 
candidates take part in a second round (for example they get an invitation to tender). 
The final awarding is made in the second stage. Almost equally important is an 
awarding process covering more than two rounds, typically including a selection stage 
and two or more rounds to narrow down the number of candidates. Large terminals are 
characterized by more complex awarding processes, while an awarding process of only 
one round is frequently used for small and medium-sized terminals. The Mediterranean 
ports generally opt for a one-round process, while northern European ports often opt for 
several rounds. 
Table 4: The stages in the awarding process. 
 ALL Size of terminal Region 
  <50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha Baltic H-LH 
range Med Other 
In case of awarding of the 
terminal via a competitive 
process, what kind of 
stages/rounds does the 
awarding process include? 
        
The terminal is awarded to one of 
the candidates in only one round 38% 41% 60% 0% 0% 22% 64% 43% 
In a first round the number of 
candidates is reduced via a 
selection stage. The remaining 
candidates take part in a second 
round (for example they get an 
invitation to tender). The final 
awarding is made in the second 
stage 
32% 29% 40% 20% 50% 33% 18% 43% 
The terminal is awarded in more 
than two rounds, typically 
including a selection stage and 
two or more rounds to narrow 
down the number of candidates 
29% 29% 0% 80% 50% 44% 18% 14% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The survey also gives insight into the methodology used to award terminals. In about 
48% of the terminal projects, the port authorities used some sort of uniform awarding 
formula or system for all terminals in the port. For large terminals of more than 100ha 
this figure amounts to 75%. In the remaining 52% of the cases the method was 
determined ad hoc based on the specificities of the terminal project under consideration 
(only 25% for large terminals). 
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4.2. Competitive bidding: the selection phase 
 
Table 4 revealed that in almost two thirds of the cases, the competitive bidding 
procedure consists of two or more stages. The first phase typically involves a selection 
or qualification stage based on experience and financial strength of the candidates. The 
first stage in the bidding procedure reduces the number of potential bidders thereby 
avoiding the risks of non-compliance by unreliable bidders. In approximately 86% of 
the competitive bidding procedures considered, the selection stage includes minimum 
requirements related to the financial strength of the candidates. The most commonly-
used financial parameters relate to a threshold value for the turnover of the candidate 
(mentioned by 38% of the respondents who use minimum requirements related to the 
financial strength of the candidates), a threshold value for the cash flow of the candidate 
(22%) and a maximum value for the ratio between the amount to be invested by the 
company and the turnover or net accruals of the company (28%). 
In approximately 92% of the competitive bidding procedures considered, the selection 
stage included minimum requirements related to the relevant experience of the 
candidates. The experience of the candidate can for instance be demonstrated by the 
management of facilities for similar cargo in the same or other ports. The candidate thus 
has to credit his experience in the activities related to the project by giving proof of 
specific antecedents in the exploitation of terminals. The most common ways for port 
authorities to ask proof of relevant experience relate to: 
- Experience in any part of the world in the operation of terminals of the same kind 
as the terminal that is being awarded (mentioned by 62% of the respondents who 
use minimum requirements related to the relevant experience of the candidates); 
- A minimum worldwide terminal throughput (in tons, TEU, number of passengers, 
etc..) required to be eligible as a candidate (24%); 
- Experience in any cargo handling operations in ports located in any part of the 
world (24%); 
- Experience in the operation of terminals of the same kind and in the same region 
as the terminal that is being awarded (6%); 
- Experience in any cargo handling operations in the same region as the terminal 
that is being awarded (3%). 
 
4.3. Competitive bidding: the final awarding phase 
 
Table 5 gives an idea of which documents and plans candidates have to submit to the 
port authority in view of the final awarding of the terminal. A technical implementation 
plan is compulsory in nearly all terminal projects under consideration, while requesting 
a financial plan and a marketing plan is a very common practice as well. 
In about 70% of the terminal projects, each bidder had to quantify the staff 
requirements and also had to present studies of environmental and territorial impact 
covering aspects such as the impact of the terminal operations on the environment and 
the alternatives to eliminate, reduce or mitigate certain effects. 
When asking about whether or not the port authority uses a formalized system in the 
final awarding stage, 41% of the respondents indicated they have no specific 
quantitative mechanism in place, but make a final choice based on a qualitative overall 
appreciation of the proposals. In 59% of the cases, the respective port authorities use 
some sort of scorecard system: various aspects of the proposal are rated and the results 
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are added up to a weighted or unweighted score, based on a score for each of the 
evaluation criteria related to the elements in the proposal. 
Table 5: Components to be included by the candidate in view of the final awarding stage. 
 ALL Size of terminal Region 
  <50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha Baltic H-LH 
range Med Other 
Share of cases that 
incorporate the following 
elements in the documentation 
candidates have to prepare in 
view of the final awarding 
stage(s) 
        
Technical implementation plan of 
the terminal ordered by stages 
according to the growth of the 
traffic 
98% 95% 100% 100% 90% 100% 100% 100% 
Financial plan, including: 78% 75% 83% 88% 30% 91% 100% 86% 
Expected cash low 46% 40% 67% 63% 20% 55% 67% 43% 
Expected prices and maximum 
charges the operator expects 
to charge 
32% 35% 50% 25% 10% 18% 58% 43% 
Costs of the operation 
(including manpower, 
equipment, fuels and other 
inputs and supplies) 
37% 35% 50% 50% 20% 27% 50% 43% 
Marketing plan that defines the 
demand of services for the 
terminal and justifies the 
prevision about the magnitude 
and requirements of the 
installations, including projections 
of yearly throughput for a number 
of years 
76% 80% 67% 75% 60% 73% 92% 71% 
Employment impact: 
requirements of staff 71% 75% 83% 50% 30% 82% 83% 86% 
Environmental plan covering 
aspects such as the impact of the 
terminal operations on the 
environment and the alternatives 
to eliminate, reduce or mitigate 
certain effects 
73% 65% 100% 63% 60% 73% 75% 86% 
 
The survey also contained a section on the importance of the various criteria used in 
the final awarding of the terminal (see figure 2). The overall results show that the 
expected throughput is considered as the most important criterion in about 50% of the 
terminal projects considered. In about 23% of the cases, the port authorities attributed 
the second highest priority to the throughput criterion. Price bids play an important role 
as well, but in 30% of the terminal projects the price bid was not part of the awarding 
process due to the specificities of the pricing system used by the port authority (see next 
section for a more detailed analysis). Other important criteria used in view of the final 
awarding stage of a terminal include the contribution to the economic development of 
the region/country, the financial proposal (others than the price bid) and the technical 
proposal for the terminal. It is interesting to observe that in about three quarters of the 
terminal cases, the respective port authority explicitly or implicitly includes criteria 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 45 (2010): 83-101 
 94 
related to the preservation or introduction of intra-port competition in the port. Other 
factors related to the market structure within the port (such as whether the candidate is 
an incumbent firm or not) are less frequently used as criteria in the final awarding 
phase. Other factors that were occasionally mentioned by respondents relate to the 
expected time gap between the awarding of the terminal and the start of the operations, 
the inland transport issue, the feeder network concept and the risk profile of the 
candidate (loyalty concerns). 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Price bid 
Expected throughput on the terminal
Technical proposal for the terminal
Financial proposal, others than the price bid
Whether the candidate is an incumbent firm or not
Factors related to the intra-port competition in the port
Contribution to the economic development of the
region/country 
Contribution to employment in the region/country
Rank 1 Rank 2  Rank 3 Rank 4 or 5 Rank 6, 7 or 8 Criterion is not considered 
Criteria considered in the final awarding stage of the terminal
The criterion with a rank value of '1' is the criterion with the highest importance when awarding a terminal. 
The lower the rank, the lower the importance.
 
Figure 2: Criteria used in the final awarding stage – all terminals. 
 
The throughput criterion is an important issue, also for smaller terminals. Port 
authorities seem to attach greater value to whether or not the candidate is an incumbent 
firm in case the awarding process concerns a smaller facility. Safeguarding intra-port 
competition and the contribution to the economy are higher for large terminals. In 30 to 
35% of the cases involving smaller facilities, the latter factors are not even considered 
in the final awarding stage. 
 
 
5. Survey results: the duration of the terminal contract 
 
An internal survey by the European Sea Ports Organization (ESPO) held a few years 
ago (ESPO 2005) revealed a big variety in terminal contract durations in European 
ports. It is not in line with reality in the port sector to try to fit everything in one set of 
average durations. The existence of a wide variation in durations is confirmed in the 
survey (table 6). Contract durations in the sample ranged from 4 to 65 years. Two thirds 
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of all terminal contracts have a term of 21 to 40 years. Not surprisingly, larger facilities 
tend to have longer contract durations. 
In 58% of the terminal award procedures included in the survey, existing laws impose 
minimum and or maximum limits on the duration of the terminal award contract. 
Legislators have developed thresholds on concession durations in view of safeguarding 
free and fair competition in the port sector. 
Table 6: The term of the terminal award. 
Duration of the contract ALL Size of terminal 
  <50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha 
Less than 10 years 6% 7% 0% 0% 
11-20 years 18% 33% 17% 0% 
21-30 years 38% 47% 50% 13% 
31-40 years 24% 0% 33% 63% 
More than 40 years 15% 13% 0% 25% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
About 59% of the port authorities in the survey sample point out that the duration is 
determined ad hoc based on the specificities of the terminal under consideration. The 
remaining respondents underline they deploy some kind of uniform formula or system 
to determine the contract durations for all terminals in the port. 
Table 7: Criteria used for the determination of the contract term. 
Duration of the contract ALL Size of terminal 
  <50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha 
Factors that play a role in the determination 
of the duration af the contract. Share of 
cases that consider the specified factor 
    
Investment levels by the terminal operator 75% 79% 50% 75% 
Investment levels by the managing body of the 
port or the government 38% 37% 50% 50% 
Level of dedicated layout/equipment at the 
terminal versus level of multifunctional use of 
the terminal 
15% 5% 17% 25% 
Type of terminal/commodity handled on 
terminal 15% 5% 33% 38% 
Location of the terminal in the port (for example 
a strategic deepwater location) 10% 5% 17% 25% 
The status of the terminal site (greenfield site 
versus brownfield site) 13% 11% 0% 38% 
The existing and expected future level of 
competition between market players in the port 8% 5% 0% 13% 
 
While clear rules of thumb on the determination of the contract duration seem hard to 
find, the survey clearly indicates the duration mainly varies with the amount of the 
initial investment required both from the terminal operator and the port authority. Many 
of the other factors considered in table 7 have direct implications on the required 
investment levels, e.g. the type of terminal/commodity handled on the terminal, the 
level of dedicated layout/equipment at the terminal, the location of the terminal in the 
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port and the status of the terminal site (greenfield site versus brownfield site). These 
other factors do not play a strong role in case of smaller terminals. Surprisingly, port 
authorities in the sample generally seem not to take into account the existing and 
expected future level of competition between market players in the port (intra-port 
competition) when deciding on the contract duration. In other words, the number of 
players in one specific terminal market segment inside the port area does not seem to 
have an impact on the contract term (the figures for large terminals are significantly 
higher though). Other factors that can play a role in the setting of the contract duration 
relate to the compliance with the development policy of the port, land lease and other 
easement rights and the refurbishment of historical sites within the concession area. 
In 61% of the terminal projects the term of the contract was or is preset by the port 
authority. In the remaining cases, the term is the result of a negotiation between terminal 
operator and the port authority. Occasionally, the port authority might opt to leave it up 
to the bidder to indicate the term in years that he requires. 
The duration of the agreement is of crucial importance both to terminal operators and 
port authorities. In general, long-term agreements allow private port operators to benefit 
from learning-by-doing processes and to achieve a reasonable ROI. Port authorities try 
to find a balance between a reasonable payback period for the investments made by 
terminal operators on the one hand and a maximum entry to potential newcomers on the 
other (Notteboom, 2007). As long-term agreements limit market entry, intra-port 
competition will only take place among the existing local port operators. As discussed 
in the next section, port authorities can include safety valves in the contract, so as to 
make the terminal available to other candidates in case the existing operator does not 
meet specific performance thresholds.  
 
 
6. The survey results: contract stipulations 
 
6.1. General overview 
 
Once the terminal has been awarded, the port authority and the terminal operator draw 
up a contract. The contract typically stipulates that a private company is allowed to 
operate a specified terminal for a given duration. The design of the contract, starting 
with the rights and obligations of both parties involved is a key element. In principle, 
the port authority has no guarantee that the terminal operator will meet its objectives. As 
such, contracts often take the form of performance-based agreements to create 
incentives for the terminal operator to meet the objectives of the port authority. The 
results allow to identify key elements in terminal contracts (table 8). 
The most commonly used clauses relate to minimum throughput requirements, 
environmental clauses and clauses with regard to changes in the ownership structure of 
the terminal (present in over 80% of the contracts). Slightly less widely used are 
renewal or extension clauses and stipulations that empower the port authority to end the 
contract. In about 40% of the cases the contract contains clauses on minimum 
investment levels required, modal split and or clauses referring to what happens if the 
contract is not extended after the end of the regular contract term. Clauses with respect 
to the conditions that allow for a renegotiation of the terms of the contract are not 
widely used (mentioned in only 25% of the cases). The sections below zoom into the 
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various clauses. The inclusion and enforcement of specific clauses depends partly on the 
existing balance of power between the port authority and the terminal operator. 
Table 8: ‘As is’ survey: clauses in a terminal contract. 
 ALL Size of terminal 
  <50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha 
Clauses included in the award contract 
between the managing body of the port and 
the terminal operator (as share of all 
projects) 
    
Throughput guarantees 93% 84% 100% 100% 
Environmental clauses 85% 89% 67% 75% 
Modal split clauses for hinterland transportation 35% 26% 50% 38% 
Renewal clauses or extension clauses 58% 63% 50% 63% 
Clauses with respect to the conditions that allow 
for a renegotiation of the terms of the contract 25% 32% 17% 38% 
Clauses referring to what happens if the 
contract is not extended after the end of the 
reguar contract term 
40% 42% 17% 63% 
A minimum investment clause of x Euros over 
the total duration 40% 42% 33% 38% 
Clauses with regard to what happens if the 
terminal ends up under a different ownership 
structure 
80% 74% 67% 88% 
Clauses that empower the managing body of 
the port to (unilaterally) end the contract 70% 74% 67% 88% 
 
6.2. Throughput guarantees 
 
Table 8 reveals throughput guarantees are included in more than 90% of the sample of 
terminal contracts. The port authority generally indicates upfront a minimum throughput 
to be guaranteed by the terminal operator. This should encourage the operator to market 
the port services to attract maritime trade and to optimize terminal and land usage. The 
survey results show that in 67% of the contracts with throughput guarantees, contract 
clauses explicitly mention that the terminal operator has to achieve a minimum cargo 
volume for the terminal as a whole. In only few cases port authorities put forward a 
minimum cargo volume to be handled per hectare of terminal area or per meter of quay. 
The survey results made it clear that the threshold values in the throughput clauses are 
often determined via negotiations between terminal operator and the port authority 
(mentioned by respondents in 46% of the terminal cases). Also quite common is the 
fixing of the throughput guarantees by the port authority based on port benchmarking 
exercises (32%). The involvement of a public/government body, other than the port 
authority, in the setting of the minimum throughput requirements is far less likely to 
take place (mentioned in only 14% of the cases). One of the respondents referred to a 
system of minimal threshold values determined by the port authority based on port 
benchmarking exercises and final threshold values in the throughput clauses determined 
by the results from the awarding process. 
The contracts typically contain provisions in view of protecting the terminal operator 
and the port authority against arbitrary and early cancellation. However, about 70% of 
the contracts also contain clauses that empower the port authority to (unilaterally) end 
the contract in case the terminal operator does not meet certain preset performance 
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indicators. In case the terminal operator does not meet the throughput guarantees as set 
in the agreement, 68% of the contracts in the sample explicitly refer to the payment of a 
penalty to port authority (e.g. a fixed amount per ton or TEU short) or, in the most 
extreme case, the terminal will be taken away from the operator. One of the respondents 
clarified the port uses a sanctioning system based on a fee to be paid by the terminal 
operator as a percentage of the amount of a year’s lease payment. In only 3% of the 
analyzed terminal projects, the port authority leaves room for negotiations to determine 
the real fee to be paid. Quite a number of port authorities (i.e. 22%) use throughput 
clauses as a soft objective (an intention) and consequently do not impose a sanction in 
case the throughput figures are not reached.  
 
6.3. Environmental clauses 
 
Table 8 demonstrated that environmental clauses appear in 85% of all terminal 
contracts of the survey. In about 30% of these cases, the environmental clauses refer to 
the compulsory use of some sort of environmental management/reporting system, while 
maximum emission levels are included in 18% of the contracts. About 9% of the 
contracts only refer to specific technical equipment to be used to limit emissions (for 
example coldironing for vessels, electric yard equipment, etc..). About one fourth of all 
contracts combine several of the above environmental clauses. Occasionally, ports 
include clauses on existing or future contamination of the terminal site. Quite a number 
of respondents who do not include specific environmental clauses in the contract added 
that the terminal operations should comply with national environmental standards 
stipulated by the law. 
 
6.4. Modal split clauses for hinterland transportation 
 
Recent terminal contracts increasingly adopt modal split specifications, particularly in 
a container terminal context. The results point to the inclusion of modal split clauses in 
35% of all contracts considered (table 8). In half of these cases, the contract elaborates 
on some technical specifications and compulsory investments to be done by the terminal 
operator in hinterland transport infrastructures on the terminal site. In only 21% of the 
cases, the modal split clauses explicitly impose a specific modal split on the terminal 
operator to be reached by a certain year (for example: 40% road, 40% barge and 
shortsea and 20% rail by 2010). In about 14% of the cases, the modal split to be reached 
is specified for each year of operation. The modal split target is often formulated as a 
soft objective (an intention). 
 
6.5. Renewal clauses or extension clauses 
 
Many terminal award contracts (nearly 60% in the survey sample) contain stipulations 
on a possible prolongation of the terminal award beyond the official term. The most 
popular contracts arrangements are: 
- Clauses referring to the conditions for renewal of the terminal use after the end of 
the regular contract term (mentioned by 39% of the respondents who included 
renewal or extension clauses in the contract); 
- Clauses referring to an extension of the contract term if the terminal operator 
makes additional investments during the regular contract term (18%); 
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- Clauses referring to interim evaluations (for example every five years) during the 
contract term. The continuation of the terminal use is subject to a positive 
evaluation during the interim evaluations (18%). 
Furthermore, many port authorities make a possible extension of the contract term 
subject to a direct negotiation between terminal operator and the port authority at the 
end of the regular term (38% of the cases). Port authorities opt for a public procedure in 
30% of the cases. In some ports, the terminal operator can request a prolongation of the 
terminal contract based on major investments made by the operator throughout the 
contract term or in the last years of the contract term. Such request is then examined by 
the port authority. 
 
6.6. Clauses referring to what happens if the contract is not extended after the end of 
the regular contract term 
 
Some 40% of the contracts considered contain clauses referring to what happens if the 
contract is not extended after the end of the regular contract term. In 63% of these cases, 
the clauses explicitly refer to financial compensations for the value-added linked to 
investments made by the terminal operator in a specified period prior to the end of the 
contract term. In less than 7% of the sample, the port authority included clauses 
referring to arrangements with respect to employees/personnel linked to the terminal 
operations once the contract term ended.  
Port authorities in Europe seem to follow different paths when it comes to dealing 
with the terminal superstructure at the end of the contract. In 30% of the cases under 
consideration, the port authority decides at the end of the contract term on what to do 
with the superstructure. Common approaches also include the removal/destruction of 
the superstructure by the terminal operator at the end of the contract term (28%) or the 
transfer of the assets to the port authority without any form of compensation (26%). The 
survey further revealed that it is not common practice for the port authority to 
financially compensate the terminal operator for the superstructure that was transferred 
at the end of the contract term (15%). 
 
 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
 
The European Commission has confirmed in its recent European Ports Policy 
Communication that terminal awarding agreements granted by public port authorities 
are to be considered as service concessions under EU law, regardless what their status is 
under national law of Member States. This means that terminal awarding agreements 
are subject to a number of basic principles with regard to equality of treatment, 
transparency, proportionality and mutual recognition. The guidance of the Commission 
however still raises a number of unanswered questions which need follow-up. 
The survey made clear that a large diversity exists among European ports, particularly 
in terms of the specificities of the awarding procedures deployed. The survey results 
mainly capture current practices in ‘landlord’ ports in Europe, thereby excluding quite a 
number of European ports. Hence, the issue discussed in the report is not relevant for 
highly integrated ports. While performing the survey and analyzing the results, it 
became clear that the observed diversity is to a large extent the consequence of: 
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- The range of and priorities in objectives followed by the respective port 
authorities (e.g. micro-economic objectives such as profit maximization or 
throughput maximization and macro-economic objectives such as the creation of 
value-added for the community and employment);  
- The specific local situations and markets the ports are operating in; 
- The size difference among the terminals considered. 
In other words, the specific design of the contract, its regulatory regime, the pricing 
regime and the way the terminal is awarded reveal the priorities of individual port 
authorities and as such play an important role in local port governance. 
Notwithstanding existing differences, the terminal awarding practices in European 
ports seem to be converging with respect to some specific aspects. The vast majority of 
European port authorities are trying to optimize the use of scarce land via the inclusion 
of throughput specifications in the contract. They are also increasingly using the 
terminal awarding process in view of a broader environmental compliance of port 
activities and a sustainable development of the port. 
Port authorities continue to use terminal award procedures also in view of shaping the 
structure and market organization of the terminal handling business in the port area, 
thereby in principle ensuring further capacity growth for efficient incumbent firms and 
ensuring intra-port competition by allowing new entrants in case a poor competitiveness 
urges the port to do so. 
All of the above points make that port authorities should be given the possibility to 
work out awarding procedures for new terminals taking into account local objectives 
and the need for a sustainable and highly competitive port context. However, fierce 
competition and the fear of traffic losses increase the risk of putting port authorities in a 
weak position, eventually making them less observant and strict with regard to the 
editing and the enforcement of the rules in the contract. With the emergence of 
international terminal operator groups and shipping lines, port authorities are confronted 
with powerful and footloose players. 
If further policy action at a national or supranational/EU level were to be envisaged, it 
should be aimed at empowering port authorities better to fully take up their 
responsibilities and to further develop their role as (local) regulator in an environment 
that provides legal certainty to all parties involved. The survey results seem to suggest 
this can best be done through guidelines on general principles instead of detailed 
legislative proposals. 
Terminal awarding policies as part of governance structures are not static but evolve 
constantly in line with the requirements imposed by the market. The dynamics in the 
port environment urge the port authority to continuously evaluate the effectiveness of its 
terminal award policies in light of market trends. This further supports the argument for 
giving full ‘ownership’ and responsibility on terminal awarding procedures to the port 
authorities. A code of good governance, as intended by ESPO, could be a useful 
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